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DEFINING AGGRESSION-UNITED STATES POLICY
Rodney V. I Ianscn
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to
analyze the position of the United
States in opposing the adoption by the
United Nations of a definition of aggres·
sion.
Several related factors are considered
germane to a discussion of the problem
as it is stated. First, the position of the
United States regarding the criminality
of aggressive war is examined in order
that the moral position of the United
Statl's ran he deterlllinrd. It ig not
ron~itll'n'd within lhl' ~l'ope of thi~
trratmcnt to atltlrc8s lhl' queslion of lhl'
legality of aggressive war, but merely to
l'llJl~itll'r the plllil'Y 1'~l'lIl1:;l't1 hy the
Unitcd Stales on the suhject.
I n an aLtemp t to provide an overview
of the multitudinous definitions extant
in the world community, a short resume
of the early definitions is presented
together with representative examples
of the two major types of definition. No
attempt is made to deal extensively with
the vagaries of the many definitions
promoted by the individual nations of
the world.
The Soviet definition presents the
:.,rrl'nlrst dcpnrture 'from thl' norllls of
l'urn'nt pral'lit'l' in till' lInitl't1 Nati(ln~
and nppl'ar:; to hc eurrcntly favorcd hy a
rather large percentage of the United
Nnlions memhership. In ordcr lo nppre·
eiate the potential effect upon U.S.
policies, past and present, the subStance
of the definition is considered in juxtaposition to both the general nature of

U.S. foreign policy actions and to'
specific examples of past episodes involving the international use of force by
the United States.
Finally, an attempt is made to illustrate how the application of the elements of the Soviet definition in cases
of suspected aggression may operate
against the interests of the United States
within the United Nations.
I-·AN OLD ISSUE REVISITED
The Soviet Resolution. In December
1967 the 22d United Nations General
Assembly considered a resolution, submitted by the Soviet Union, which again
placed the que~tion of defining aggression before the United Nations:

Convinced that a primary problem
confronting the United Nations in the
maintenance of international peace remains the strengthening of the will of
States to respect all obligations under
the Charter,
Considering that there is a widespread
conviction that a definition of aggrcs·
sion would have considerable importance for the maintenance of international peace and for the adoption of
cHeetivc meab"llreS under Ihe Charter
for preventing acts of 3{!gression.
Notillg that there is still no generally
recognized definition of aggression,
1. Recognizes that there is a widespread conviction of the need to expedite the definition of aggression;
2. Establislles a Special Committee
on the Question of Defining Aggression. composed of thirty· five Mcmber
States to be appointed by the President
of the General Assembly, taking into
consideration the principles of equitable geographical represcntation and
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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the necessity that the principal legal
systems of the world should be representcd:
,~. Requests the ~ccn'tary-Gcncral
to provitle thc Spl'cial COllllni!tl'c with
till' I\l'('cssary faciliti('s anti R'n'ices:
5. Decides to includc in thc provisional agcnda of its twcnty-third scssion thc itcm cnlilktl "Rcport of thc
Special Committcc on the Question of
Defining Aggression."1

A letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. had proposed inclusion of the resolution on the
agenda. This letter contained a series of
statements that smacked of the usual
Soviet propaganda, but to many nations
of the world community the proposals
seemed to reflect an accurate exposition
of the problems weighing upon the
conscicncc of the "law-abiding" nationstatcs. Thc Soviets proclaimed " ... of
late, there have been increasing instances of the use of armed force to
commit acts of aggression against sovereign States and to crush peoples struggling against colonialism and for frecdom and indcpendcnce." The Russians
continued by stating that acts of aggression were undermining peace and
security and increasing the danger of the
outbreak of a new world conflict. "In
conjunction with the vigorous condemnation of aggression and the adoption of
measures preventing it, the formulation
of a definition of aggression could,
particularly in the present international
situation, make an important contribution to the cause of peace." The proposed definition would be "a stern
reminder to the forces of agl,'Tcssion and
wlIr Ih1l1 Ilwy III'1Ir r('~pon~iJ,ilily for
violllLing intcrnalionlll pcaee."2
In the debate that followed, the
Soviet delegate noted with regret that in
previous United Nations sessions the
adoption of the Soviet draft definition
of aggression had been blocked by the
United States and added, "lIad there
been a unh'ersally recognized definition
of aggression, the American interventionists would find it far more difficult

to mask their crimes in Viet Nam ... "
since Vietnam was in no position to
pose a threat to the security of thc
lInill'd Slllll's. 'I'll(' Sovil'l rl'prc~senlnlivl!
poin",d out lhlll his ('olllltry had 1)(,I'n a
ehampion of a clear-cut definition of
a/!I,'Tession since the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference. Scveral countries, he continued, had thwarted the good intentions of the Soviet Union in order to
further their own selfish interests of
intervention in the affairs of other
countries and trying to suppress the
people's wars of liberation. 3
A total of 28 nations entcred the
subscquent debate on the subject. The
Soviet satellites addcd their usual iteration of the party line. but, in addition,
many other delegaLcs to the assemhly
spoke out in favor of the Soviet resolution. A brief summary of some aspects
of the debate illustrating typical arguments is presented below.
Africa. Algeria argued that it was
essential to define the general principles
of the Charter more closely ancl added
that international tension had heen
artificially created to block the advance
of colonial peoples to independence.
This situation had led to major conflicts
such as in the Dominican Republic,
Vietnam, and the t\liddle East. Any
policy which reward cd thc aggressor,
according to the Algerian delcgalc.
would ::,pell thc suil'ide of thr lInilt'cl
Natiolls. The Algerian argulllent ellclccl
by pointing out that the definition of
aggression would complete the listing of
principles of international law dealin/!
with anll governing friendly relaliolls
and cooperation. 4
The ))emocratic Hcpuhlic of thc
Congo also favored definition. but thcy
felt that any attempt would be inadequate unless it included prohibition of
forms of aggression such as propaganda
and assistance to armed rcbel hands
operating against anothcr Statc. as wcll
as prcssure on the State and passive or
active assistance to armed rebel bands
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operating against the political or economic institutions of thc Statc or
il!!ainl't ils nalurill n'sourccs. a The
Sovit't tll'finilion, tli~l'u~I'11 in Chapl!'r
111. pnwi,h's l'rill'ria n,fl'rrl'd to hy llll'
COIlI!0h':'I' ddl'!!iltion.
J,ihcria, too, favored a definition,
cven though past cfforts had provcd
fruitless. The delegate added that since
thc last attcmpt was made, in 1957, thc
mcmbership of the United Nations had
incrcascd appreciahly and should provide a bctter environment for defining
aggression. 6
The Middle East. The rcprcsentative
of Iran argucd for the definition and
enumerated two principles that had
promptcd thc carlicr quests for dcfinition: first, to univcrsalizc thc principlcs
of thc Nurclllhcrg trials; mill sccond, to
strcngthen thc basis of judgmcnt CIIIploycd by the organization for the
maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. lIe continued
by noting that although the search for
definition had lain dormant for scveral
years, the Gcneral Asscmhly and
Sccurity Council had both entered upon
paths which were more likely to lead to
an acceptable and feasible definition. 7
Thc Iraqi delegation adopted a policy of
wholehearted endorsemcnt of the Sovict
resolution which could provide a key to
prcvcnling the crosion and collapse of
inll'rnalional onlrr, if it mil!hl lead lo
an al'l'l'ptablc ilnd pr!'cise dl'finition of
a/!gression. The Syriiln Arab Bepuhlic
voiced similar sentiments, adding that
argulllcnts against the proposal were a
reflection of the desire of certain
fHlw1'rs til safl:gllllni their tll'lfish intl:rcsts and to cnsure that force would
prcvail over law. a
The represcntative of Afghanistan
said that a definition would help the
Sccurity Council in its deliberations.
Asia. India welcomcd the initiative of
the Soviet llnion in brinl!ing the mattcr
bcfore thc United Nations, pointing out
that collective security was vital to the

smaller nations, and everything possible
must bc done to strengthen the system.
Tlw definilion of aggression woultl he,
:1l'l'Ortlill!! 10 Ihl' hllliilll tll'I!'!!:!Il', II
\\llrlhwhill' sll'p in thaI llin'l'lilln. TIll'
Indians fdt Ihat the rc:!:;on the «<Hi7
dclinilion was not :Hlopted WilS to provide thc many new memhcrs of th(:
organization an opportunity to consider
thc matter and offer their views. The
time had now comc for rcsuming work
on a definition of aggression. 9
Camhodia presented an argument
similar to that of India, hut notcd that
the lack of a dcfinition enablcd thc
United States to perpetrate crimes all
over the world against thosc who dared
to reject its domination) 0 Thc Philippines favored adoption of an objective
definition and urged the Assembly to
move ahead with the task. Thailand
indicated that a definition would be
beneficial but doubted that the time
was right for an attempt, and China also
spoke out a/!ainst definition.
Westem Hemisphere. The represcntative of l\lexico said his government
had always held that a definition of
aggression was legally and technically
feasible, and the result would he useful
and appropriate. The delegation announced thal a dcfinite decision on the
l/uestion could he taken up at the 24th
SCl'Sion.l 1 Cuha echoed the ~oviet contention that a definition was bl'in)!
hIOl'k(~d hy states ('ngal!cd in a!!l--'fl's:,ion
and who wcre not interested in anything
which might contrihute to its eOlldemnation.
The United States Stands Alone. TI\('
U.S. representative argued that since his
delegation surmised that the Soviet item
was pure propaganda, he had opposcd
the proposal. The delegate then pointed
out that our involvemcnt in Vietnam
was in the rolc of a dcfender against
aggression ami that the United States
had proposed that the matter be debated in the Security Coullcil. In contrast to ils slaled b('nr\'oll'nt eOIlCI'f11
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for world order. the 1l.~.~.IL had emharked on a program of aggression
eomllll'nein~ in I ();~:~ with tlw inl:orporati(lII of E:4onia. I.ilhuania. lIIlIl
I.alvi<l inlo I he ~o\'il'l linion. Thi:, \\'01:'
followl'd by the suhVl'r:.'ion of C)I;('l'hoslovakia in 1(HB, the ai(lin~ and ahellin~
the Korean inva:;ion of 1950, and the
suppression of a free government of
Hungary in 1956. All of these aggressive
actions were perpetrated by a nation
which had since 1933 favored an international definition of aggression. The
United States closed its argument by
stating that it would he glad to discuss
the Soviet proposal in the proper forum,
which was not thc General Assembly,
but in the Sixth Committce.
Considcring the entire debate, a total
of 22 nations spoke out in favor of the
Sovict proposal to pursue the quest for
defining aggression and were generally
in favor of the Soviet draft definition.
Of those who entered the debate, an
additional eight favored definition but
preferred a broader abstract definition,
and one preferred a 1I10re comprehensive version of the Russian proposal. A
total of only six nations, the United
States, United Kingdom, Chilla, Norway, Canada, and Australia spoke out
against definition.
In the (;eneral Assemhly votc on the
~ovil't propo"al an O\'l'rwlll'lmin~ majority of ()O nalion:.' voll'd for thl'
rl':.'olution--I B ab:.'lainl'd from v()tin~-
and a single nation, the United States,
voted ap;ainst adoption of the measure'.
Tlw illlplieations of thi!> votl" alIhou:!h drama til:, do not nl'I'I':-;:-;arily
suggest thaI the United States is Ulll'l) uivocally opposed to discussions of the
definition of aggression, hut emphasize
the fact that the U.S. policy has generally been oriented against the Soviet
policy of pressing for a definition of
aggression.

of

This latest incident in the (;eneral
Asscmhly dot'S S('1'\'1' to revivify th('
l'ontinui;llTr da:.'h of :'m'il'l and llnill'd

~t<ltl'S inter!':.'t:.' in the political and II'I~al
aspects of defining ap;gression and again
opl'n!> the IJIII'stion of whdlll'r the: U.S.
plllil"~, in Ihl' I'onl I"" I or 1111' I'urn'nt
world :,ilualion, i:, Hllill iu OPI"):,iu/!.
almo:-;t :,inl!"'han(h,(l\y, L1I1' propOSI'"
!-'o"ict dcfinition or a:rp;rl':'sion.

II--CIUi\lIN ALlTY 0 F
AGGRESSIVE WAR-TilE UNITED STATES POLlCY
In addressing the question of formally defining aggression in the context
of the larger foreign policy of the
United States, it is first necessary to
examine the question of aggressive war
and the U.S. policy on that subjcet. In
general, United Nations actions arc
recommendatory in nature and not
hinding on the parties involvcd. This is
particularly true in the case of perlnanent members of the Sccurity Council,
since the only action that could be
taken against them, assuming the usc of
the veto power, would he hy the
General As~emhly under the Uniting for
Peace Resolution:
[The United Nations] provides for the
organization of collective force to frus.
trate aggression whenever the great
powers arc unanimously disposed to
support such action; but it docs not
create an enforeemcnt mcehanism
capable of being used to control great
powers or states backed by !,'feat
powers)

Even though :;anction:.' could not he
forced on the United States hy th('
Assemhly, the U.S. (;overllml:nl ha~
consistently mainlained the posilion, at
least on the surface, that it must he
"morally" correct in int('rnaliolwl dealings. As the principal driving force in
the' founding and nurturinl-( of the
organization, the United States must
maintain an appearance of allegiance to
the principles and goals of its Charter.
Secretary of State Rusk defined our
concepts of U.S. policy in the Unitcd
Nations by stating that our I-(oals, in
part, were "Security through Stren{!;th:
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to deter or defeat G{!{!'cssion at any
level, whether of nuclear attack or
limited war or subversion and guerilla
tactics," and "Community undcr Law:
to assist in tIll' :..rradual emer~cnce of a
gl'lIIline world l'ommunily, basl'd on
coopcration and luw ... "2
President Johnson cllunciuted the
official view of the I !nilell Stutes whcn
hc stutea, "We support the United
Nations as the hest instrument yel
devi~cd to promote the pcuce of the
world ... "3
Since the Unitcd States is firmly
committed to upholding lhe purposes of
the United Nations, a definition of
aggression could have serious implications in the conduct of its foreign policy
if, in fact, the Unitcd States has cstablished a firm policy on lhe outlawing of
wars of aggression. Although many individual statements of Govrrnmcnt officials have alluded to a denunciation of
altgressive war, a hrief examination of
the background and chronology of
events germane to the matter will estahli~h a morc definite determination of
U.S. policy. The criminality of aggressive war is a suhjeet 0'1 continuing
discussion by the world legal community, and the legal aspects of a
definition are not within the scope of
this treatment. The subject can be
approached, however, from a discussion
of the record of the United States in
malll'rs im'olving altp:rcssivc war and as
c\ idelll'l,d hy polil'), proIllHlIll't'ml'nts.
Prior to the 20th ccnturv, the United
Statcs maintained a relati~ely dormant
posture on the consideration of the
criminality of aggressivl~ war. The lad,
of early interest wus not founded on a
lack of experience in warfare. As
pointed out by (,luincy Wright, "The
United States, which has, perhaps somewhat unjustifiubly, prided itself on its
peacefulness, has had only twenty years
during its entire history when its army
or navy has not heen in active opemtion
during some days, somewhere. ",~

Perhaps the first steps in the manifestation of official U.S. policy on the
suhject were the Hague Conventions of
] 899 and 1907 and the Geneva Convenlions of 1929. These eonventions made
no alll'mpts at dl'lilllilalion of IIII' I"p:al
aspcds of war it~c1r. Bulthc nuLion~ did
agree "before an appeal to arms ... to
have recourse, as far as circunistances
allow, to the good offices or mediation
of one or more friendly powers."5 The
humanitarian principles set forth in the
treaties were definite first steps toward
the eventual prohibition of aggressive
war as an element of U.S. policy.
In 1928 the United States made two
significant moves toward the denunciation of aggressive war. In February a
resolution of 21 American Republics,
including the United States, resolved at
the Sixth (Havana) Pan-American Conference that " ... war of aggression
constitutes an international crime
against the human species."6 More importantly, the Pact of Paris, Letter
known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
signed on 27 August 192B by the
United States, Great Britain, Germany,
France, Japan, Italy, Poland, Belgium,
and later by 11 total of 63 nations,
provided a seemingly definitive concrete
condemnation of war and called upo.n
all parties to "renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations to one another."7
Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Secretary of
State and an internationally respected
lawyer, in 19:32 enunciated the American interpretation of thc Kellogg-Briand
Pact:
War betweell lIations was renoulleed
by the si!!nalories of the Briant!Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has
become illegal throughout practically
the entire world. It is no longer to be
the source and subject of rights. It is
no longer to be the principle around
which the dutics, the conduct, and the
rights of nations revolvc. It is an illegal
thing. Hcrcaftcr whcn two nations engagc in armed conflict eithcr onc or
both of thcm must bc wrong.doers-violators of this gcneral treaty law. We
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no longer draw a circle about them and
treat them with the punctilios of the
duelist's code. Instead, we denounce
them as law-breakers. By that very act,
we have madl' obsoletc many Ic:::al
prc('('(It'nts ant! han- :::in'n th(' It':::al
profl'$.<ion III(' ta~k of f('('x:IIninin:::
many of its codes and tr('alil's.1I
The legislative branch of the United
States had previously conllnitted itself
to the outlawry of war when on 12
December 1927 the Senate adoptcd a
resolution introduced by Senator William E. Borah which contained the
dictum, "that is the view of the Senate
of the Unitcd States that war between
nations should be outlawed as an institution or means of settlement of international controversies by making it a
public crime under the law of nations.''9
The interpretation of Secretary Stimson and Senator Borah was by no means
universal. The world legal community
did not unanimously consider the pact
as an international criminal code. Mr.
Kellogg implies that the treaty bearing
his name gives the nations involved the
right to determine their own guilt or
innocence in matters involving a violation of the treaty: "Every nation is frce
at all times and regardless of treaty
provisions to defend its territory from
attack or invasion, and it alone is
competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in selfdefense."10
The gencral disagreement over the
viahility of thc pact as a source of law
centcred on the lack of sanctions in the
systcm to deal with violators of the
pacl. Thl' stlnelion of world opinion was
not ('onsidered adeq lIate in giving the
pact the characteristics requisite of a
substantive elcmcnt of the law of nations. Lautcrpacht held that "This
'epoch-making' document Lthe KclloggBriand Pact] thus could not really be of
any lcgal significance for the future
validity of the law of neutrality; there
wcre not even any tcchnical difficulties
arising from it in this connection. "11

The International Law Association,
in recognition of the divergent opinions
of international legal scholars and, in
partieular, the l'OII1:l'rn of tlw lInih'rI
~tat('s O\'('\' th(, lad.. of (1"f1nith'" "nfon"'J\I('nt 1II,'aSlI\'('S intl'insil' 10 llll'
pact, adopted a serics of resolutions at
its confcrence in Budapest on 10 September 19:H. Thcsl~ resolutions arc
known as the "Budapest Articles of
Interpretation." They read in part:
(2) A signatory State which threatens to resort to anned force for the
solution of an international dispute or
conflict is guilty of a violation of the
Pact.
(4) In the event of a violation of the
Pact by a resort to ann cd force or War
by one signatory State against another,
the other States may, without thereby
committing a breach of the Pact or of
any rule of International Law, do all or
any of the following things:-(a) Refuse to admit the exereise by
the State violating the pact of belligerent rights, such as visit and search,
blockade, etc.
(b) Decline to observe towards the
State violating the pact the duties
prescribed by International Law, apart
from the pact, for a neutral in relation
to a belligerent;
(c) Supply the State attacked with
financial or material assistance, includ·
ing munitions Of war;
(d) Assist with anned forces the
State attacked. 12
These interpretations tended to solidify
the substance of the pact and enforced
the U.S. policy proscribing international
use of force.
Prior to the advcnt of World Wur 11,
the policy of the United States regarding the criminality of war was weIl
estahlishcd, and the Ic!!al eontlmt of lhl'
policy was extended to the addre8sing
of the legal ramifications of aid to
victims of aggression. NaturalIy, the
United States adopted the philosophy
that since wars of aggression were repugnant to the international community,
aid to the victims was a logical reaction
of the government. The general policy
as stated by Hobert II. .Jackson. then
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Attorney General of the United States,
was:
Present aggressive wars arc civil wars
against the intrmational connnunity.
Al'eordingly. as fI'spllnldblt, IIIrlllbrrs
of that eOllllllllllily. WI' ran tfl'at vii-·
tinlS of aggression in the Satl1l~ way we
treat legitimate governments when
there is civil strife and a state of
in~llrgeney··that is to say. we an~ JlI'rmiHed to give to defendi~ goven!ments all the aid we ehoose.13
Mr. Stimson, Secretary of War at that
time, testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs with respect
to the proposed lend-lease bill, pointed
out that the United States was primarily
rcsponsible for the increasing recognition of the criminality of aggressive war,
but added that " .•. It has not been
recognized ... by these Houses of Congress here that were the parents of it,
what a vital change was made in the
system of international law by that
action." The significance of the U.S.
leadership against aggressive war was not
largely appreciated by Congress or the
public.l 4
World War II and its widespread
destruction gave renewed impetus to the
need for a true international world legal
system with potent international organization to maintain the force of law ovcr
the law of force. The loss of life from all
sources during World War II was estimated to be over GO million.l 5 Certainly the advent of nuclear weapons
assured a potential population destruction increase of at least an order of
magnitude in the "m:xt" general war.
The legal aftermath of the Second
World War was initiated hy the precc(h·"t-~elling Nurt·mherg trial:;. It ~I\()uhl
be notcd, however, that the punishment
of defeated leaders was not "illegal" or
without precedent. In 405 B.C. the
Lacedaemonian Admiral Lysander, after
the destruction of the Athenian Fleet,
called his allies together to determine
the fate of his prisoners. The council of
allies was similar to a court which heard
witnesses and examined the evidence

before arriving at a judgment and sentence. All prisoners, except one, were
sentenced to death.
The precedent of the Nurcmberg
Irial,.; wa,.; Iht' nlh'mpl 10 ('~Inhli,.;h a
,.;uh:::lanli"e rule of law. makin!! ag!!n',.;sive war a crime for which individuals '
could be held accountable and punished. This had the effcct of cstablishing
in world opinion the principle that
justice and law had triumphed over the
law of force. The promise of Winston
Churchill, made on 8 September 1942,
was destined to be consummated by the
Nuremberg trials:
... Those who arc guilty of Nazi
crimes will have to stand up before
tribunals in every land where the
atrocities have been eommiHed. in
order that an indelible warning may be
given to future ages and that successive
generations of men may say, "S60
perish all who do the like again." 1
[Emphasis supplied]
The Nuremberg tribunal and its charter provided the United States with an
impressive step forward in its quest to
codify the criminality of war. The
United States chose as its chief representative Robert H. Jackson, Associate
Justice of the SI\preme Court and former Attorncy General, who had long
been a proponent of increased emphasis
on codification of the criminal aspects
of war. In an address to the InterAmerican Bar Association at Havana on
27 i\larch 19·~7, ~Ir. Jackson as Attorney General said:
... No longer can it be argued that the
civilized world must behave with rigid
impartiality toward both an aggressor
in violation of the treaty and the
vietilllS of unprovoked aHaek. We need
not now be indifferent as between the
worse and the better cause, nor deal
with the just and the unjust aIike.l 7
Mr. Jackson had rather broad official
guidelines for his task as U.S. Representative to the International Conference
on Military Trials which commenced in
June 1945. The guidelines included (1)
The i\Ioscow Declaration, which formed
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the immediate basis for the establishment of the International Military
Tribunal, and the charter. This declaration established the general guidelines
for the trials and madc provh~ions to Lry
major war criminals, noL in national
courts, but by "joint dccision" of allicd
governments; and (~) the Yalta i\lemoran dum, addressed to the Prcsidcnt of
the United States, which established
U.S. overall policies and guidelincs in
the conduct of war crimes trials. It
included delineation of the crime to be
considered by the tribunal and provided
a base date of 1933 as the beginning of
German criminal actions. The memorandum also included guidelincs for selecting and identifying those to be punished
and the difficulties that might be encountered in identification. The document ended with a recommended program for trying the criminals. Of particular importance is the emphasis on
the aspect of making an authentic
record of German crimes.
In the proceedings of the conference
the U.S. representative adopted a singular policy: to make the chartcr of the
International Military Tribunal and the
proceellings of the trials themselves
stand as a massive fralllework for the
dcvclopment and codification of suhstantive international criminal law. The
Russian delegate, Gen. LT. Nikitchenko,
adopted the philosophy that trials were
of a purely ephemeral nature, desi{!ned
to inflict sUlIlmary punishment on the
bcatcn Nazis. In thc ddihcratiolU; on the
language of the charter, Nikitchenko
made the following pronouncemcnt re/!anling the U.S. propol.'al for the ddinition of war criminals: "In my opinion
we should not try to draw up this
definition for the future ... "18
II is general opinion regarding the
legal substance of the charter, so importan t to .I ustice .T ackson, is indicated- in
this statement of the Russian: "The fact
that the Nazi leaders are criminals has
already been established. The task of
the Tribunal is only to determine the

measure of guilt of each particular
person and mete out the necessary
punishmcnt--the sentences. "19
Professor A.N. Trainin, of thc Soviet
dl'll'/!aLion, also 1H'lil'vl'd LhaL LI,,' c'onl.'idl'raLion of the conft'f('nl:l' I.'hllulcl hc:
limitcd Lo the task at hand and not he
concern cd with providing futurc guidance for international lawyers: "Thcrc
might come a time when there wiII be a
permanent international tribunal of the
Unitcd Nations organization, hut this
tribunal has a definite purpose in view,
that is, to try criminals of the European
Axis powers ... "20
The French delegation, headed by
Judge Robert Falco, generally adopted a
policy of not accepting the principle of
law that aggressive war constituted a
defined criminal action. Professor Andre
Gros, the assistant representative of
France, set forth the basis of the French
position when he said, "We clo not
consider as a criminal viola tion the
launching of a war of aggression. "21 ]n
contrast to the United States, the
Frenchmen did not desire to he associated with an attempt to formulate
international law. The French representative pointed\ out that "We are not
declaring a new principle of international law. We are just dcclaring we are
going to punish those responsible for
criminal aets. "22
The British representative, Sir David
Maxwell Fyfe, sllccinctly stated the
position of his government in this sLaLement,
The question comes to this: whether it is right or desirable to accept thc
position that a war of a~!-'I"cssion is a
crimc. It secms to he :Igrccd that it i~.
The fundamental difficulty is the lack
'of sanction. i\lore smetly it may be
said that it is acccpted as a erime
without declared punishment or any
declared sanetion against it. 23

This position was essentially parallel to
that of the United States, and this
parallelism was generally ohserved
throughout the whole of the delibcrations.
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1\,lr. .T ustice.J ackson, during the forming of the charter. main tained his insistence that the results of their efforts
would fulfill the dual role of establishing the guilt and selting the punishmenl
of the Nazi hierarchy and of providing
future legalists with a carefully prepared
source of law rcflecting 'the policy of
the Unitell Stale!>. lIe further emphasized the orientation of the United
States by noting, "Our altitude as a
nation, in a number of transactions, was
based on the proposition that this (war]
was an illegal war from the moment that
it was started ... "24
In his report to President Truman,
Justice Jackson summarized his position
concerning the development of law
using the charter as a vehicle for establishing the criminality of aggressive war:
This Pact constitutes only one in a
series of acts which have reversed the
viewpoint that all war is legal and have
brought intemational Law into harmony with the eommon sense of mankind, that unjustifiable war is a
crime .•. Any legal position asserted
on behalf of the United States will
have considerable signifieanee in the
futUre evolution of Intemational
Law. 25

The United States, a major participant in the drafting of the United
Nations Charter, continued its position
as a salient. force in the quest for
establishing a legal basis for the outlawing of aggressive war. The provisions
of the charter very nearly approach. at
Icust theoretically, the complete suhjugation of aggressive war to the international community. Signatories to the
charter arc bound to "settle their international disputes hy I)(~aed\ll nwans"
and to "refrain in their international
relations from the threat of use of
force •.. "26
The Security Council was entrusted
with the power to react, with the use of
force if neccssary, to "any threat to the
peace, breach of peace or acts of aggression."27

In summary, the policy of the United
States during the 20th century has been
one of continuing to press for recognition of the initiation of wars of aggression as an international crime. Our
position was particularly strong during
the deliherations for the development of
the charter for the International Military Tribunal, even though other participants in the' negotialions·-ltussia anl!
France.-adopted a philosophy that the
universal denunciation of agl,>Tessive war
as an international crime was nol in
consonance with the "facts of life"
extant in the world political community.

III-DEFINITIONS OF AGGRESSION
In Chapter II the policy of the
United States regarding the illegality of
aggressive war was surveyed, disclosing a
continuing effort to preclude the legal
use of force in the cause of aggression.
The difficulties in characterizing the
concept of aggression and in defining
exactly who is the ag{,>Tessor in a singular
episode have paralleled the development
of the concept of outlawing aggressive
war.
The paradoxi~al nature of the prohlem can he illustrated by considering
that in spite of apparent agreement
among world leaders on the principle
that ag6>Tessive war is a crime to be
condemned by international law, the
buildup of arms throughout the worid
has continued at an unprecedented
pace, and an almost continuous parade
of armed conflicts have transited the
pages of history in recent decades. The
imbroglio has arisen from the fael thal
the effects of agreement on the principle have been negated hy a widespread
disagreement as to the meaning of "aggression." No definition of the term has
ever been aeeepled by the policymakers
of the international community, and
each "side" believes the other will
couch its aggressive overtures in terms
of repelling the aggressive designs of the
"other side."
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It is not a case of failing to attempt
to arrive at a universal ab'Teement on the
exact definition of aggression, but is
rather that the continuing process has
met with frustration hl'caust! of Ihl'
widt' diwr/!t'I\('c of opinion on IIIl'
a\'cn\l(':;, of approaeh 10 Ihe final product. Gcnerally speakinl,'" the world comlIlunity is polarized 011 the subject, one
camp being the "definers," the other
the "nondefiners." The "definers" are
further divided within their own group,
as will he discusscd in Chapter IV. In
thc critical matter of defining ag/,'Tession, the policy of the United States has
heen of an ambivalent nature, initially
on the side of the "definers" during the
pre-United Nations period, then leading
the "non definers" in the Unitlld Nations
deliberations. A review of the development of the circumstances leading to
the current stalematc among diplomats
and jurists must necessarily prccede an
attempt to establish the dcsirability of a
definition of agf,'Tcssion in the contcxt
of the U.S. position as a world "supcrpower."
Early Views on War and Aggression.
War and thc use of force have been an
integral part of life on this planet since
before the appearance of man and have
only recently becn considered to be
violations of legal order. Animal warfare
probably bcgan well before the Paleozoic Era as competition betwcen thc
cytoplasmic cells for the nceessities of
survival. As the sophistication of lifl'
forms rose to the highcr levels of true
animal life, so did the methods and
techniques of warfare. The use of force
in the allimal world can gerwrally lw
eOIH;idcred to arise from rivalry for
possession of some external ohjeet,
from intrusion of a strangcr in the
group, or from frustration of activity.!
These hasic causes of "war" among
animals remain in the legacy of man,
bllt the arrival of man and his amazing
intellectual capacity have added to thc
causative factors lcading to thc usc of

violence. Primitivc lIlan generally fell
into four dcgrecs of militancy:
... [1] the most unwarlike peoples
who fi[!ht only in defellsc; [2 J the
modrratrly warlike who fi[!ht for
sport, ritual, rl'\'('II!!I', 1ll'f$llllal prt'"li!!I',
or othl'r ~lll'ial purpll>'C; 1:11 thl' lIIort'
warlike who fight for economic purpores (raids on herds, ex tension of
grazing lands, hooty, slaves); and [,~]
the most warlike of all who, in addition, fight for political purposcs (extension of empire, political prcstig~
maintenance of authority of rulers),~

As man became more civilized, the
causes of war remained rather stable,
but the techniques improved, and the
impact of war became more universal in
nature. In addition, war became the
subject of intellectual exercises peculiar
to the human race, which leads to the
consideration of thc problcm of defin in/! al,',1,'Tcssive war and forrrllliating
rulcs for the identification of the aggrcssor in a particular conflict.
Early Definitions. The question of
differentiating the "guilty" and the "innocent" parties in cases involving the
use of intcrnational force has heen
considered by jurists of the world for
centuries. Belli, in 15(,3, considered war
illcgal "unless thcre is need for defense."3 Grotius, in his definition, considered an aggressive attack one
" ... launched with criminal ohjectives,
e.g. murder, pillage, robbery, etc. "4
In 1650, ~5 years after Crotius cnunciated his definition. Hiehanl Zouehe
said of war, " ... a lawful contention,
that is, a contention movcd hy le/!itimate authority and for a lawful
cause."5 He then delineated the cau~eg
which hc considercd lawful, "A lawful
cause is an injury which it is allowed
both to avenge and to rcpel, whence a
war is said to be either of offemlt', or of
defense; as Camillus in a declaration to
the Gauls said, 'All things which heaven
allows us to defend, it allows us to
reclaim and to avcnge. "'6
Toward the end of the 18th century,
Christian Wolff in his book Jus CelltulII
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.l1ctllodo Scicl1tiJica PertractatulII considered tht' question of establishinl! a
rule for making a distinction between a
"ju:>t" mill an "unjust" war. lit! desl'rilll'd Ihn'l' ha:;il' ::ilual ion::, all\, 0111'
ul' whit-h l'llIIld I'rm'itll' Ih,' ha:;i:;' for a
"ju::I" war. Tl\(')' Wl'n' "( I) TIll' .. Uailln\('nt of om"s OWII or Ih .. t which oll/!:ht
to be one's own, (2) the establishing of
seeurity, (3) the preventing of threatened danger or the warding off of
injury,"7 thus providing the perennial
"loophole" for a potential aggressor to
wage war in the guise of "preventing
threatened danger." I3ynkershoek, a
contemporary of Wolff, wrote that in
his view only two causes could be
considered grounds for labeling a war
nonaggressive, " ... defense or the recovery of one's own."8
III Ilw s:m\(' Iwriod olh,'r writers
l'onsid,'n'd Ihat allY 1I1I"lIIpl 10 dl'fille
th,' "a/!:~n'~or" or uujuf;1 party to a war
was meaningless. In particulat:, II obbes
said "in a war of all against all it is
logical that nothing can be called unjust, "9 and II all contended that
" ... both parties to every war are
regarded as being in identical legal positions, and consequently as being possessed of equal rights."lO The comments of I lall generally reflected the
mien of the 19th century when war and
aggression were generally considered to
be outside the realm of justice and
intermltionallaw.
iIIodem Definitions. COIILrastl'd to
Lhe early writers. who aLLempted to
defille the just party in a contention
involving force, the 20th century legalists lwve appJ'OadH'd Ihe pl'Ohl':m of
deLer/llilling the ulljust party-·ur the
"a~f.,'l"essor." Probably the earliest example of a large f.,'l"OUp of slates al,'l"eeillg
upon restrictions to war was the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Conflicts at the First
Hague Conference of 1899, where the
signatories a!,'l"eed to attempt mediation
measures'before recourse to arms.!l

League of Nations. Only one reference to "aggression" was made in the
Covenant of the League of Nations, in
article I 0, which provided:
1I1l'1l111l'r,; or Ih,' 1."Ill!II" IIIlth'rl:I""
III n'~p"cI :11111 pn'~I'rvI' :1:' lll!aill~t I'XIl'rnal :ll!J..'TI':<siOIl Ihl' It'rrilorial ill"'grily alld I'xillting pulilkai illllt-PI'lIIlt'IIl'"
or :Ill 1l1(,ll1hl'~ or lhe Le:lglII'. III e:L<,'
or any such aggression the council shall
advise upon the means hy which this
obligation shall he fuIrillcd.l 2

TIle'

The covenant, although calling upon
its memhers to preserve the inte!,'l"ity of
other memhers against aggression, did
not specifically prohibit war if the
correct "procedures" were followed.
More specifically, war was allowed if
certain delays, specified in article 12,
had been observed: if the coulleil could
not attain unanimous ab'l"eement ullder
article 15; or if the war were waged
against an adversary who had not acecpted the unanimous recommendation
of the council.
Even though the League of Nations
did not provide a blanket ban on a~~es
sive war, member statcs werc called
upon to suppress aggression under the
advice of the council. The interpretation
of exactly what constituted the aggression of the covenant became the subject
of concern in the international community. As professor Sollll has written,
"No civilized system of law is satisfied
with a general prohibition of 'acts violating the interests of other persons,'
but tries to enumerate the prohibited
acts [trespass, larceny, murder] and to
define in more precise terms the aggravating and attenuating circumstances
resulting in higher or lower punishment."l3
The Pact of Paris (Briand-Kellogg
Pact) for the Denunciation of War as all
Instrument of Policy decisively ou tlawed, by implication, aggressive war
and provided additional impetus to the
moves toward defining aggression.
During the League's later years
several attempts were made to formally
define aggression, beginning. with the

46
Geneva Protocol of 1925 which in its
definition of aggression included "a
resort to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the CovenanL." A
different and more rigorous form of a
definition was intToduced by the Soviet
Union at the Disarmament Conference
of 11):1:l, This d.-fillitioll, with vcry
minor variations and additions, survivcd
thc ~ucceediu~ :1;' years with neithl'r
complete rejection nor adoption by thc
world comlllunity. This Sovict definition of 193:1 is almost identical to the
one submitted to the Gencral Assembly
of the United Nations in 1953 and will
not be quoted in detail at this point. It
did, however, list five acts that would be
considered as branding the first to commit as an aggressor-.( 1) Declaration of
war against another State, (2) Inva:>ion
of another State without a dcclaration
of war, (3) Bombardment of another
State or attacking its land or sea forces,
(4) Landing of forces within the territory of another State without permission or if permission was granted, failing
to withdraw on request, and (5) Naval
blockade of another State. This early
definition failed to include the sixth act,
which did appcar in postwar Soviet
definitions--the support of armed bands
organizcd in its own territory which
invade the territory of anothcr State.
Following the listing of aggressive
acts, a series of situations were listed
which could not be used as an "excu~e"
for commission of the forbidden actions. This included attempts to protect
either capital investments or a nation's
own citizens in hack ward eountries.l 4
The Leaguc of Nation:; did undertake
the question of defining aggression during thc preparation of the Treaty of
Mutual Assistance by the Pcrmancnt
Advisory Commission. The report did
not directly addrcss the problem of
defining aggression but did contain rcmarks whieh eharacterizcd infiltration
and invasion as acts of aggression and
provided guidance on "si~s which be-

token an impending aggression" which
were determined to be:
(1) Organization on paper of industrial
mobilization;
(2) Actual organization of industrial
mobilization;
(3) Collection of stocks of raw rnatcrials;
(,t) Organizing of war industrics;
(5) Preparation for military mobilization;
(C,) Actual milit<!I)' mobilization;
(7) Hostilities.1 5

In the prewar period the United
States was a signatory to several treaties
which alluded to a definition of ag/,'Tession. Typical of these were the provisions of the Declaration of Principles of
Inter-American Solidarity and Coopcration adopted at the Intcr-Ameriean Conference for the Maintcnance of Peace at
Buenos Aires on 21 Dcccmber 19:16. In
this declaration the following principles
were adopted by the American Community of Nations:
(a) Proscription of territorial conqucst and that, in consequence, no
acquisition made through violence shall
be recognized;
(b) Intervention by one State in the
internal or external affairs of another
State is condeJ\lned;
( c) Forcible collection of pecuniary
debts is illegal; and
(d) Any difference or dispute between the American nations, whatever
its nature or origin, shall" be settled by
the methods of conciliation, or unrestricted arbitration, or through
opcration of international justicc.lC,

Post War Policy_ Thc U.S. delegation
proposed that a definition of aggression
be included in the text of the Charter
for the International l\lilitary Tribunals.
This definition closely paralleled the
Soviet 1933 version:
An aggressor, for the purposes of
this Article, is that state which is the
first to eommit any of the following
actions:
(1) Declaration of war upon anothcr
state;
(2) Invasion by its armed forces,
with or without a declaration of war,
of the territory of another state;
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(3) Attack by its land, naval, or air
forccs, with or without a declaration of
war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another state;
U) Naval blockade of the coasts or
ports of anotlH'r stall';
(5) I'rovision of :;upport to anm'lI
bands fonned ill its territory which
have invaded the territory of anotllCr
state, or refusal, notwithstrutwng the
request of the invaded state, to take in
its own territory, all measures in its
power to deprivc those brutds of all
assistanec or protection.
No political, military, ceonomic or
otltcr considerations shall servc as an
excuse or justification for such actions;
but exercise of the right of legitimate
self-defense, that is to say, resistance to
an act of aggression, or action to assist
a state which has been subjected to
aggression, shall not constitute a war of
aggression. 17

An intriguing interlude in an international' paradox was the insistence of the
United States delegation on the inclusion of the Soviet definition and the
insistence by the Russian delegation not
to provide a definition of aggression in
the charter of the tribunal, albeit their
own!
Definitions in the United Nations.
The Charter of the United Nations
includes such terms as "threats to the
peace," "breach of the peace," and "act
of aggression," but does not attempt to
further define or amplify these ambiguous aud comprehensive terms. This was
not un ovcrsi~ht, but lhc rrt'ull of a
dcliberute action by the drafters, in
spite of intensive pressure to define
aggression. The primary proponent of
this move to include a definition in the
charter was Oolivia. This delegation suhmitted a proposal which would have
required the Security Couneil to apply
sanctions "immediately by colleetive
action" when it found a state to be an
aggressor in accordance with the following terms:
A statc shall be designated an aggressor if it has committed any of the
following acts to the detriment of
anotlter statc;

(a) Invasion of another state's territory by armed forces.
(b) Declaration of war.
(c) Attack by land, sea or air forces,
with or without declaratiou of war.
(d) Support ~iv('n to arnll'd bands
for !III' JlnrpO$(' of inva~ion.
(e) Intervention in anothcr state's
internal foreign affairs.
(f) Rcfusal to submit the matter
which has caused a dispute to the
peaccful means provided for its settlement.
(g) Refusal to comply Witll a judicial decision lawfully \?ronounced by
an intcmational court)U

Similar amendments were submitted
by Czechoslovakia and the Philippines.
The Bolivian proposul was supported
by Colomhia, Guatemala, Iionduras,
r-.lexico, Uruguay, Egypt, Iran, New
Zealand, and the Philippines. All permanent members of the Council, except
China, were opposed to lhe prop08ul
and were supported by Czechoslovukia,
the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa,
White Russia, Chile, and Paraguay.1 9
The generul argument against the proposal was that while a definition of
aggression was complex alHI difficult,
"recognition of un act after it had been
committed would be simple. "20
The final debutc on the subject
ended when a clear majority of the
committee decided that a definition
" ... went beyond the possibilities of
this confercnce and the purpose of the
Charter." The originullext was rctuincd,
sallS definition, and the Council was left
with "the entire decision as to what
constitutes a threat to peace, a hreach
of peace or an act of ag/.,rrcssion. "21
The question of defining aggression
lay dormant in the United Nations for
several years, primarily since the "superpowers" both had opposcd the inclusion
of a definition in the charter. The break
in the definitional silence occurred in
1950 following the paralysis of the
Security Council and the suhsequent
"Uniting for Peace" resolution. Since
the Assembly had no power to compel
measures against a convicted ug/,rrcssor,
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but depended upon the eonsent of the
United Nations membership, an easily
applied, clear-cut definitioll of a/!:.,rression was cOllsitll'red hy some of thl'
memhers to he lIl'ec~ary to aS~lIn'
unanimity in the Assemhly Ikcisions.
The Sovid lInion revitali;t.ed tlll~ slIhjet:l
of definition by slIhmiLling the substance of its draft definition of 193:1 (or
consideration by the International Law
Commission.22
The Assemhly, rcsponsive to the
widening demand for a formal approach
to the problem of definition, appointed
a special committee of US merllhers on
the "C)lIestion of I)cfining Ag/.,rression"
and instrucled the commiLlee to produce "draft definitions or draft statl'ments of the notion of a/!grcssion. "2:\
The report of this conlJlliltee (':;tahlishetl the ('xi:;tellc(' of two hasic approaches among those who favored definition-the "general" definition and the
"enumerative" definition.
The Soviet draft of the enumerative
definition is practically identical to the
1933 version espoused by the United
Stales in 1945 during the Il\IT Charter
negotiations. The Soviet delegate, noting that aggressors perennially utili;t.cd
the concept of "preventive war" or "self
defense" as an excuse, proposed a listing
of examples of direct aggression:
The State which first comlllits one
of the following aels:
(a) Declaration of war against anothcr Statc;
(b) Invasion by its armcd forces,
even without a declaration of war, of
the territory of another State;
(c) BOlllhardlllellt hy its lalld, :;('a,
or air forces of the territory of another
Statc or the carrying out of a delibera te attack on the ships or aircraft of
the lallcr;
(d) Thc landing or leading of its
land, sea or air forces inside the boundaries of another State without the
permission of thc govemment of the
latter, or the violation of the conditions of such pcmlission, partieulary as
regards the length of thcir stay or the
extent of the area in which they lIlay
stay:

(e) Naval blockade of the coasts or
ports of anoUlCr State;
(f) Support of armed bands organizt'd in its own tt'rriton' whit-h
invadl' LlII' It'rritory of ano(h~'r :-;(all',
or r('fusal, on lJ('ing f(''1\1('~l<'d hy LlII'
invadl'd Slate, 10 take in its own
lI'rritory any action within its power to
deny such bands any aid or protection. 24

The Soviets then list a serie:; of
episodes which arc considered to be
forms of indirect aggression which
would condemn a state which fll'st:
(a) Encourages subversivc activity
against another State (acts of terrorism, diversion, etc.):
(b) Promotes the outbrcak of civil
war within another State:
(c) Promotes an intcrnal uplll'aval in
another State or a re~~rsal of policy ill
favor of the aggressor.- 5

Economic aggression included the following acts:
(a) Takes against anoUlcr State
measures of economic prcssure violating its sovereignty and ceonomic
independcnce alld Uueatcning thc basis
of its economic life;
(b) Takes against anoUler Siale
measures prcventing it from exploiting
or nationalizing its own natural richcs:
(e) Subjects another State to an
economic blockade. 26

and ideological a/!/.,rre8sion:
(a) Encourages war propaganda;
(b) Eneoumgcs propaganda in favor
of using atomic, bacterial, chemical
and oUler weapons of mass dcstruction;
(e) Promotcs the propagation of
fascist-nazi views. of racial and national
exclusivcnl'l'S, and of hatred and contempt for oUlCr pcoples. 27

The U.S.S.R. also proposed acel~pt
anee of a series of cOlllmon "excuses"
used by aggressors in past incidences,
but which would no longer be considered as justification of aggression.
These criteria were divided into two
categories. One was the internal position
of the State under coercion and these
included:
(a) The backwardness of any nation
politically, economically or culturally:
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(b) Alleged shortcomings of its
administration:
(c) Any danger which lIIay thrratrn
thr lire or pr<Jpl'rty (If a1i('n$:
(d) Any n'\"o\ntionary or l'ounh'rn'volulionary moven\l'nt, civil war, disordrT$ or strikes;
(c) The establishment or maintcnanee in any State of any political.
economic or social system. 28

The acLs or legislation within a State
wcre also removed from possible consideration as justification for aggression.
Thcse acts included:
(a) The violation of international
treaties;
(b) The violation of rights and interests in the sphere of trade, concessions or any other kind of economic
activity acquired by another State or
ils citizl'ns;
(c) The mpture of diplomatic or
economic relations;
(d) Mea.."Ures in connection with an
economic or financial boycott;
(c) Repudiation of debts;
(f) Prohibition or restriction of
immigration or modification of the
status of foreigners;
(g) The violation of privileges
granted to UlC official representatives
of another State;
(h) Refusal to allow the passage of
anned forces proceeding to the territory of a third State;
(i) Measures of a religious or antireligious nature:
(j) Frontier ineidenls. 29

[n conclusion the Soviet definition provided:
In the evrnt of the mobilization or
concentration by another State of con~hlerabll~ armed forccs ncar its frontier,
till' Stall' whirh i$ tlm'all'llI'll bv l'ndl
aetiun shall have thl' righ t uf rc:eollT$!'
to diplomatic or other means of secllring a peaecful settlcment of interimtional disputes. It may also in the
meantime adopt requisite measures of
a military nature similar to those dcscribed above, without, however, crossing the frontier. 30

This Soviet definition is the archetype of the so-callcd "enumcrativc"
definition which catalogs a widc range
of ag:.rrcssivc situations. The Soviet format has remaincd stahlc since 1933, hut

the list has been expanded from the
original five ovcrt military acLs to the
(,lIffl'nl lil'1 of I!) whidl inl'ludl's the
illllifl'l'I. ('I~OllOllli(·. aud id('ololJ;il'al ('ult'goril's of alJ;lJ;n~~ion.

The second typc of definition approachcs the subject on a diffcrent tack.
The abstract definition attempts to exprcss the mcaning of aggrcssion in thc
broad cst possible terms. An excellent
example of the ahstract definition is
that submitted by Mr. Ricardo Alfaro to
the Intcmational Law Commission:
Aggression is the usc of force by
one State or group of States, or by any
Government or group of Governments,
against the territory and people of
oUler States or .Governments, in any
manncr, by any llleUlOds, for any
reasons and for any purposes, except
individual or collective self-defensc
against anned attack or coercive action
by the United Nations. 3l

[n this definition the "first to commit" concept is absent, and it does lillIe
to provide decisionmakcrs with specific
guidance.
A third variant is a "mixed" definition which includes an ahstract interpretation of aggrcssion, followed hy an
illustrative. hut brief, list of spccific
instanccs of aggrcssion.

IV--THE SOVIET DEFINITION VS.
UNITED STATES POLICY
In debates on dcfining agwession a
large proportion of the "definers" aI"HIed to at least guarded approval of thc
Soviet draft definition. It is apparcnt
that if a definition is adopted thc
substance of it will not operate alltomatically on the facts of a particular
case, and, indeed, the "facts" are not
usually known in early stages of any
United Nations debatc. It would nonethelcss be useful to address the effect of
an objective application of the definition to specific episodes of pasL {I.S.
foreign policy machinations. In alldition, the broad implications of the
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definition to the larger policies will be
briefly examined.
Broad Implications. The Charter or
the United Nations states that til(! purpose of the organization is "to take
effective collective measures for the
prevention and rellloval of threats to the
peace, and for the :mpprcBSion of lIels of
al!grcBSion or other breaches of the
peace." L~mphasis supplied.] 1 The
charter further provides, under article
51, for collective or individual sclfdefense against an armed attack until
the Security Council takes "measures
necessary to maintain international
peace and security."2 The United States
has frequently resorted to measures
outside the framework of the United
Nations through our "sl'curity" al!rt'l'ments. This trend in J\ lII!'1"iclIn poliey
was mentioned in a speech by Sccretary
of State Dean Rusk in 1966 when he
pointed out that the trend in U.S.
policy when the machinery of the
United Nations proved inadequate was
to reinforce it with other measures.3
In this context most of our involvements are concerned with episodes in
which we have a direct interest in the
outcome of action against a government
in power, either in overthrowing a government unfriendly toward the West or
retaining in power one orien ted al!ainst
cOlllmunism. These operations generally
involve "the landing or leading of its
land, sea or air forces inside the boundaries of another slate ... "4 in order
to promote "lin internal uphellval in
anotlll'r ~tatl' or a rI'vl"rsal (If poliey in
favor of the aggressor."5
In contrast, the Soviet Union, which
amassed the /-,'Teatest territorial gains in
the World War II period, has largely
refrained from exporting her armed
forces to areas of conflict. In areas
where conflicts requiring force may
occur, her armies are prepositioned and
do not require the invasion denounced
by her own definition. Instead. the
rcsident Soviet forces can handle any
internal difficulties which usually arise

between the Soviet puppet govcrnment
alill a l1onpupp!!l faction with dispatch,
<11111 the entire affair c:an he rctaitwcl in
the realm of an internal affair.
Following is a brief investigation of
the consequences of applying the substance of the Soviet definition to a
series of foreign policy incidents in
which the U.S. involvement precipitated
a charge of "aggression" being levcled at
this country in the United Nations. In
examining these cases the basic facts of
the case will be considered objectively
against the definition with no aLlempt
to "legalize" the U.S. position by applying the rationale adopted by the United
States in defending her actions.
Hungary. "That State shall be d('clared to have cOIllmitted an act of
indirect aggression which: (a) encourages subversive activity against another State; (b) promotes the outbrcak
of civil war within anothcr State. The
following may not be used as justification [for the acts listed J: alleged shortcomings of its administration; any revolutionary or counterrevolutionary movement."6 Althou!h the Soviet Union
could probahly be found guilty under
her own definition, e1ause (d) "landing
or leading of forces inside the boundaries 'of another State without the
permission of the government of the
latter," the question of whether the
Nagy regime was in actual fact the head
of government in Hungary is beyond the
scope of this treatmcnt. In any event
the Soviets claimed that their entry was
in reaction to "indirect" agh'l"ession
being committed in 1\ ungary by the
United States.
The campaign eondueled hy Badin
Free Ellrope alld the Voiee of J\ meri('a
had a decided effect 011 the revolution.
For instance. Tihor i\1eray, a participant
in the events, described the effect of the
broadcasts as follows: On 24 Octo her,
Premier Nagy called for "order, calm,
discipline" and immediately thereafter
" ... a vehement radio campaign was
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launchcd from ahroad against Nagy--a
campail!n IhaL had a falal errecL on all
lhal follnw,"\." On :n (klnher, Hadin
FrI'" \o:urllP" 111:1111, lhl' fnlln\\'inl! pronIlIllH~I'IIII'nt: "TIll' ;\lini:;trv of Ilt,fl'n:'"
allll the !\linisLry of the In,terior art~ still
in Com munisL hands. 1>0 noL leL this
continuc, Frecdom FighLers, do not
hang your weapons on the wall."7 Whcn
considered in the context of thc substance of Lhe Soviet definition, the
encouragement from the Voice of
America and Radio Free Europe had
considerable impact on the initiaLion
and continuation of the revolt. The
Hadio Free Europe broadcasts verifying
Amcrica's willingness to hrlp, coupled
with the U.S, inclination toward thc
liberation of Europc, undoubtedly
raiscd falsc hopes and had at least a
sccondary effect on the events. Applying thc Soviet definition in its most
literal scnsc, the United States could be
found guilty of "indirect" aggression.
China. The attacker is that state
which "first commits the following act:
Bomhardment by its land, sea or air
forces of the territory of another
state ... "8
The U.S.S.R. charged that the United
States had committed aggression and
violation of Chinese airspace by bombinl! Chincse territory. A total of 87
flights had bcen lIIade over Red Chinese
territory. The United States claimed
that () I of the flights were reconnais!lance missions, and 110 bombs werc
droppcd, and on othcr occasions hombs
werc dropped 011 Yuill Hiver hridges
thaL wcre not in Chinese territory. Two
accidcntul at Lacks on Lhe Chinese mainlanrl wcre aeknowledgl:d hy till: United
SLates. In the light of the Sovid ddinition, the United Statcs would have hcen
fOil lid glliJ Ly 0 f agl,'l'essioll.
Formosa. " ... that State shall be
declared the attacker [aggressor] which
first commits one of the following acts:
... naval blockade of the coasts or
ports of another State._ The follow~g

may not be used as justification:
Any ... civil war; or the cstablishment
nr ilia ill ten:tl\('(' ill UIIY State of :IlIY
pnlilil'al. "('Olllllllie or ~(ll'ial :;y:;!t'III. "i)
In 1'>!jO tlll~ U.S.S.H. all('I!("lthatthe
United States was committing aggression in the blockade of ports belonging
to Red China,lO and ill 1954 charged us
with committing acts of aggression by
attacking Red Chinese vessels on the
high seas.!l Early U.S. policy enunciated by President Truman declared
The United States has no predatory
designs on Formosa or any other Chinese territory ... nor does it have any
intention of utilizing its armed forces
to interfere in the present situation.
The United States government will not
pursue a course which will lead to
involvement in the civil remphasis
supplied] conflict in China)2
Our subsequent action in ordering
the 7th Fleet to act in restricting Chinese naval operations and effectively
"blockading" Chincse ports, in what we
had previously acknowledged as a civil
conflict, would have placed us in the
position of a convicted "aggressor"
when viewed in a strict interpretation of
the Soviet definition. The United States
contended that the blockade was not,
per se, a blockade, since commercjal
ship traffic was not interfered with.!3
Cuba: Quarantine. An ag/:,'l'essor is
the State which first commits the following act: "Naval blockade of the
coasts or ports of another State."
On 14 October a U.S. reconnaissance
flight over Cuba detected the presence
of medium-range ballistic missiles in
Cuba,14 The President, in a radio address, accused. the Soviet Union of
deceiving the United States and announced plans to establish a naval
quarantine of Cuba in order to prohibit
the influx of additional offensive
weapons,l5 Prior to the speech a fleet
of 98 ships, including eight aircraft
carriers, was prepositioned for immediate implementation of the President's announced course of action)6
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The first encounter with the· incoming
Soviet ships occurrcd on thc sccond day
of thc quarantine. The ship ('nterin/! the
quarantine zonl! was a tanker, ohvioullly
not carrying weapons. All other ~l)\'icl
ships revcrsed coursc or halted short of
the quarantine zonc. The result of the
naval action and political prcssure was
the promise of the Soviet (;overnmcnt
to withdraw missiles from Cuha.l 7
Under the Soviet definition of aggression, the preemptive first-strike type of
warfare is specifically prohibited, and
our action, under this definition, would
have easily qualified as an act of aggression.
Cuba: Bay of Pigs. The State which
first commits thc following is guilty of
aggression: "Support of armed bands
organized in its own territory which
invade the territory of another State."
The following may not be used as
excuses for aggrcssive acts against another State: "Alleged shortcomings of
its administration or any revolutionary
movement. "18
In 1960 the U.S. Government emharked on a plan to invade Cuba and
overthrow the Communist government
of Fidel Castro. A group of Cubans had
been recruited hy the CIA in Miami and
trained by CIA and U.S. military personnel in Guatemala.l 9 The United
States was charged by Cuha in the
United Nations with homhing Cuha,
organizing, financing, and arming hands
of Cubans in order to commit aggression. An anti-United Statcs rcsolution
was introduced hy Itulllania and was
adoptcd by the First Committee with a
vote of 42 for, 31 against, and 25
ahstentions. This rcsolution was rcjectcd
by the General Assemhly hy a very
narrow margin--41 for, 35 against, and
20 abstentions. 20
On the morning of 17 April 1961,
1,400 men of the American-trained
Cuhan brigade landed at the Bay of Pigs
in Cuha. Although the brigade consisted
primarily of American-trained Cuhans,

the first man ashore in the landing was
an American.
In this case our action was specific'ally lisle:cl as an dl'nwnt which l'olllci
Imllld a nation the aggressor, and lIgain
the Unitcd Statl's woule! have heen
potentially guilty under the Soviet definition.
Iran. The State will hc guilty of
indirect aggression which first: "Promotes the outbreak of civil war within a
state" or "Promotes a reversal of policy
in favor of the aggressor." A State will
be guilty of economic aggression who
"Takes against another State measures
of economic pressure violating its sovereignty and economic independence and
threatening the bases of its economic
life" or "takes against another State
measures preventing it from exploiting
or nat i 0 nalizing its own natural
riches. "21
Iran, a destitute country struggling
for survival, had a singular source of
large-scale income: oil. Largely hecause
of the unfavorable split of royalties
between the Anglo-Iran Oil Company,
which monopoli~ed oil resources in the
country, and the government, Moham·
med Mossadegh, a newly elected Prime
Minister, on 1 I\Jay 1951 nationalized
the company. Iranian control of the
company was frustrated by a Western
boycott of Iranian oil products. As Fred
Cook stated in his article "The CIA,"
"The international oil cartel held firm-and Iran lost all its oil revenues. "22 The
loss of income had a severe effect on the
regime of Prime I\Jinister Mossaclc/!h,
and within 7 months he was overthrown
by a eoup d'etat planned and executed
by the CIA with rather wide puhlic
knowledge of its activities. Over and
above the CIA involvement, much
covert military assistance was provided
the rebels. In congressional hearings
conducted in 1954, a Defense Department official declared that:
When the erisis came on and the Uling
was about to collapse, we violated our
normal criteria and among the oUler
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things we did, we provided the army
immcdiately ['vith matcrial] on an
cmcrgcncy basis ... the guns that thcy
had in their hands, the trucks they
rode in, the armored cars that they
drovc through the streets, and thc
radio communications that permitted
their control, were all furnished [by
the United States] .23

The rm;ult of the coup was a government favoralJle to the West and the
internationalization of the AngloIranian Oil Company. Again, viewing
the U.S. involvement in retrospect and
in relation to the Soviet definition, the
United States would have been guilty of
aggression on several counts.
Dominican Republic_ The State
which first commits the following acts is
guilty of aggression: Invasion by its
armcd forces, even without the declaration of war, of the territory of another
State. The following may not be used as
justification for the aggressive acts: Any
danger which may threaten thc life or
property of aliens or any revolutionary
or counterrevolutionary movement. 24
On the afternoon of 24 April 1965, a
radio station in Santo Domingo was
siezed IJy a group of revolutionaries
attempting to overthrow the regime of
Donald Cabral in favor of the proCommunist .J uan Bosch. The rebels were
attempting to inspire a general uprising
from the populace. 25 That same evening a task group of U.S. Navy ships,
headed by the carrier U.S.S.Boxer with
five support ships, was alerted for possible action in the revolt. As the fighting
developed the tide seemed to III: turning
against the rebels, and the task group
was ordered into position. 26 The U.S.
officials proposed to evacuate civilians
from the embattled city and were
promised immunity by both sides, the
rebels and loyalist government. By the
evening of 27 April, about 1,200 evacuees, U.S. citizens, had been moved from
the beach to units of the task force. 27
On that same day the rebcl position
improved by their capture of the Presi-

dential palace and stiffening resistance
in other parts of the city .28
The next day Ambassador Bennett
reported that there were "Leftist
forces" opposing a three-man military
junta acceptable to both rebels and
loyalists. 29 This report also requested
troop assistance prompted by a request
from the junta for assistance in "preserving the peace." The President, after
receiving reports of possible danger to
U.S. citizens, gave an order to land
troops in the Dominican Republic. The
task group commander stated during a
news conference that the Marines were
sent ashore to protect American lives
and "to keep this a non-Communist
government. "30
Our troops, with a maximum strength of about 20,000, actively cooperated
with the loyalist government in suppressing the rebel movement and effecting a
cease-fire. The United States was subsequently accused of violating both the
United Nations Charter and the OAS
Charter. The resolution, introduced by
Russia, would condemn the United
States for its action and call for immediate withdrawal of troops.31
If the U.S. actions were considered,
using the precepts of the Soviet definition, the United States would have been
found guilty of aggression.
V--POTENTIAL DANGER
FOR AMERICA IN THE
UNITED NATIONS
The Danger of Definition. If a definition of aggression can exert any adverse
effect on the goals of the United States
and its posture in the world community,
it will necessarily result from the definition being applied to our actions by a
United Nations majority disenchanted
with the U.S. machinations in world
politics. In other words, because our
policy is particularly suseeptihle to attack hy an objective application of the
Soviet definition, it will furnish a more
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easily identifiable meehanism for indictment of U.S. policies by a hostile
United Nations memlH'r:;hip. For example. it it' po::::::ihll' that in an incident
involving the American usc of force, the
United Nations mernher"hip could he
presented with the facts of the case, and
an application of the Soviet definition
to these faels might indicate a clearly
identifiable case of aggression. It is
obvious that this procedure would not
affect the votes of nations solidly backing the U.S. position, but it could
provide the impetus to push borderline
cases to the anti-U.S. votes. The borderline nations are those that are becoming
increasingly alarmed with the handling
of world affairs by the United Statrs
and would welcome a bona fide excuse
for voting against her. The ahility to
provide a prima facie case of aggression
against the United States could well
provide the necessary excuse.
Is the United States in a position to
become a target of adverse reaction in
the United Nations to aets of violence
that are now conducted with impunity'
in a legal framework?
Early U.S_ Dominance. The past history of the United Nations is replete
with examples of the United States
posting significant political victorics
over thc Communist minority. As thc
major contrihutor to the United Nations
hudget and a primary source of the
world's foreign aid supply to smaller
nations, the Unitcd States has been able
to exercise enough influence to assure a
favorahle vote, during the early years, in
any matter of substance placed hefore
thc United Nations. In regard to the
Ceneral Assemhly, Ernest A. (;ross has
offered evidence in the reeord of the
United States:
The Ameriean leadership reeord in
this fomm is a proud one. In the years
19·~6 through 1953 the General Assembly adopted over BOO resolutions. The
United States was defeated in less than
3 per eent-and in no ease where our
important seeurity interests were in-

volved. In these eight years only two
resolutions supported by us failed of
adoption.!

The early predomin:llu'l! of the
United Statcs dill not escape note hy
the Soviet Union. Vcry early in the
Unitcd Nations existenec they cxplained
their defcats by pointing out that the
imperialh;ts were attempting to turn the
United Nations into a branch of thc
American State Department to implement their plans for "Anglo-Saxon
domination."2 Many writers at that
early stage warned of the steamroller
tactics heing developed by the United
States.
Hints of U.S. Decline. In recent years
it has become increasingly apparent that
the early dominance of the United
States would prohahly not continue
unchecked. The inereasc in lIIemhl·rship
of the United Nations has been progressing steadily, with new members
consisting primarily of small ex-colonies
with a latent hostility toward any eolonial power--and the United States was
branded a eolOllial power by association, if not in fact.' In atIUition, U.S.
policies in and out of the world organization seemed designed to antagonize
the United Nations members and make
the task of U.S. "Iobhyists" in gathering
favorable votes e\'en more difficult. A
harbinger of potential troublc for till'
United States was \'oiced by Richard
Gardner, whcn he stated:
There is no ironclad guarantee for
the Unitl'd States in thl' pf('scnt procedures of the Unitcd Nations. All one
ean say with assurance is lhat the
procedures are extreml'ly favorable to
our eountry and that the authorization
of a peace keeping action against our
opposition is diffieldt to imagine, assuming always that the American position is reasonably founded in justice
[emphasis supplied] and Ule Unitcd
Nations Charter. 3

1\1r. Gardner's statement alludes to
the necessity of maintaining a position
hased on justice, a key point in that a
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just position would easily become significantly more difficult to maintain
under Ihe manll!' of II\(, ~o\'il'l (ldinilion of al!~rrt'$$ion.
The United ~Iates secmcd in mam'
ways to earn its reputation as a chan~
pion of colonialism mul, in 00 doing,
alienate a large portiun of the Unitcd
Nations vuting strcnglh--for cxamplc,
our support of colonialism during the
15th Session. In his report to Congress,
Senator Wayne Morse pointed out that
the United Slates either abstained or
voted "no" on all the major colonial
resolutions, and, in so doing, it had
hrandcd itself as a supporter of colonialism. lie pointed out as an example of a
typical faux pas the American support
of Portugal in claiming that her overseas
holdings wcrc not tcrritorics but mctropolitan provinces, thlls exempting her
fl'OlII intcrnational intcrfcrcncc sincc
dumestie law would apply. Senator
I\lorse reported that he was confronted
with many prolests or criticisllls of the
U.S. vote by members who, although
professing a strong desire to maintain
friendship with the United States, found
it increasingly difficult to do so. Senator
Morse summed up our position as follows:
.
Yet, our vote on this resolution was
so irreconcilablc with the clear meaning of Articlrs 73 and 7·1- of the (I.N.
Chllrter and with our proft'~l'd idl'ah,
about supporting indigenous people in
thcir stmggle for independcncc that
many of our friell(l~ in the Fourth
Committec were at a complete loss to
IIInlrrsland our vote. They did not
w:1Il1 to IH'Iil've what tlwy ft'art·d nllll
suspccted, but they didn't hesitatc to
tell me that they suspected that Pentagon influence, military bases, and the
NATO alliance were the controlling
factors that dictated the United States
vote.4

In a similar vote on a resolution
calling for South West Africa to permit
a suheommittee to visit the country and
report on conditions, the United States
abstained rather than vote for the obviously anticolonial measure. As Senator

Morse reported, "The United States
vote of abstention on this resolution
\\'a$ Vl'ry harmful hl'l'ausr oner again we
appt'an'd 10 Ill' sll~lail1il1g policies of II
colonial power whose policy in South
West Africa has aroused deep resentment among many African Nations."!)
Thc influx of new states, each with
potentially hostile attitudes toward the
United States, changed the complexion
of the United Nations rather radically.
When the organization was founded
there was a total of 51 members, only
two of which were from Black Africa:
Ethiopia and Liberia. The membership
now totals 117, with 33 African States
who, combined with the Asian and
Mid-East States, constitute over 50 percent of the membership. This "AfroAsian" bloc, in combination with the
Communist bloc, could theoretically
command over 60 percent of the voteclose to the two-thirds majority required for substantive issues.
The. effects of our policies in the
United Nations are obvious. A commonly used indicator of the U.S. influence in the Assembly, principally
because it reCurs so often, is the vote on
the perennial issue of seating the
People's Republic of China. As reported
in the International Review Service,
Until 1955, votes for a postponement of consideration were carried
with ease, there being at least three
times as many votes in favor of the
mora torium as those against. This
situation gradually changed with the
admission of new Member States,
especially from Asia and Africa, aflt'r
1953. In 1956, the votc favoring post.
ponement was down to 2 to 1. This
gap continued to narrow, and in 1960,
the difference became a mcre 8 votes.
Equally significant was the fact that all
newly admitted African States either
abstained from or opposed the annual
U.S. proposal. A move by Nepal for
the inclusion in the agenda of the
question of Chinese representation was
defcated by the difference of only 4votes. 6

In the 20th General Assembly a
rcsolution calling for seating of Bcd
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China rcsuILcd in a tic vote with ·l7 for
and ·t7 ;l~ainst, in(licatin~ the si~nifi('ant
weakening of the U.S. po:.:ition from it~
pre"ious position as the molder of
United Nations voting patterns. An illustration of this tn'lId against the Unitel)
Statcs is provil)ed in table 1, whieh is a
plot of the pcrcentage of nations voting
with the United States as compared to
the total number voting.
During the framing of the United
Nations Charter the American delegation, in concert with the other great
powers, insisted on inclusion of the veto
power in the Security Council in order
to insure that no peacekeeping action
could he initiated against the major
world powers. The framers recognized
that any such collective security action
was not in the interest of a stahle world
situation. In later years the United
States, viewing with horror the Soviet
use of the veto in the Security Council,
introduced the Uniting for Peace Resolution to allow the General Assembly to
act, under certain circumstances, in
opposition to the veto of a permanent
member. Although, at the time of its
introduction, the action appeared
sound, it was not universally applauded.
Among those who professed concern
was Inis Claudc, Jr., who stated that the
United Nations " ... should not challenge a recalcitrant great power. "7
At the time the llniting for Peace
Resolution was adopted, it appeared.
certa'in that it could never be turned
a~ainst its creators lIeeause of huilt-in
~fl'~uards. Not only did tlw United
States have a distinct dominance in the
General Assembly, but in the Security
Council as well. One of the stipulations
for implementing the Uniting for Peace
Resolution is that the Security Council
he paralyzed hy a veto and "fails to
exercise its primary responsibility" in
cases involving threats to peace, breaches of the peace or acts of agl,.rression.
Since the United States has always becn
able to obtain the support of a ~jority
of Security Council members, it has

hCl'n ahle to refrain from usinp; tlw veto
power in eaSt'S inilllil'allo U.S. inll'fI'sls,
therehy prel'llIplin~ applil'alion of the
provisions of Uniting for Pl'aee.
An analysis of the voting record in
Security Couueil cases involving ehargl's
of aggression against the United States
indicates that although the United
States has never been in jeopardy of
having to veto a measure, an increasingly narrow margin of votes is cast in
favor of the United States. A graph of
the voting record in seven complaints
against America is shown in table II.
Although the votinp; record of the Council shows only a slight trend against U.S.
interests, an analysis of Security Council
debates provides an even greater insi@:ht
into the decline of American influence.
In the same seven cases, and in two
others where no vote was taken, a
tabulation of debating records was
made, classifying countries as being in
one of three categories: J'm-Ullited
States, meaning that they participated
actively in defending the United States
position; Neutral, meaning that they
either did not participate in debate, dr
that they were noncommittal in defending U.S. actions; and Allti-United Slates,
meaning they dehated actively against
the U.S. position. The graph, shown in
table Ill, is a tabulation of thcse re:::ult:::.
The pattcrn :::hows the marked dccrl'u:>c
in active support garnered by the United
States in the SecuriLy Council during
recent years.
An inspection of the record indicatl':::
a trend away from Lhe U.S. po:;ition in
the Security Council. The indications
are that in future instances of intervention the United States may well have to
exercise its veto power in the Council to
thwart action against its interests. In
this case the Assembly will be in a
position to act under the Uniting for
Peace Resolution. Armcd with the Soviet definition of aggression, the charge
of aggression against the United StaLes
could well be sllstained by an increas-

TABLE I--ISSUE OF SEATING RED CHINA
Per Cent Voting with United States in United Nations General Assembly
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12th Session
24 September
13th Session
25 September
14th Session
22 Seotember
15th Session
8 October
16th Session
14 December
17th Session
30 October
18th Session
21 October
20th Session
17 November

1952

85.7%

1953

81.5%

1954

79.6%

1955

77.8%

1956

66.2%

1957

64.0%

1958

61.1%

1959

59.2%

1960

53.2%

1961

56.5%

1962

57.2%

1963

58.1%

1965

50.0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Source: Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952-1963, 1965.
~

-.l

~

00

TABLE II--SECURITY COUNCIL CASES OF UNITED STATES AGGRESSION--VOTES
Number of Pro-United States Votes
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130 January 1955
Offshore Islands
18 April 1958
l--.Ij,rctic;..pverfli!1hts
15 July 1958
Lebanon Intervention
18 May 1960
U_S.S.R.--Air Force Intervention
11 July 1960
Cuba--Aggression Overflight
8 March 1962
Cuba--OAS Enforcement Action
28 April 1965
U.S.S.R.-Dominican Intervention
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Source: Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955, 1958, 1960, 1962, 1965.
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TABLE III·-SECURITY COUNCIL CASES OF UNITED STATES AGGRESSION··DEBATE
Members Debating Pro-United States
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30 January 1955
Offshore Islands
18 April 1958
Ar"ti"Overfliahts
18 May 1960
U,S.S.R.··Air ForceAClQression
11 July 1960
Cuba··Aaaression Overflight
21 November 1961
.. Rpnllhli" IRrt. hIJ Cuba)
8 March 1962
Cuba··OAS Enforcement Action
10 January 1964
Panama
16 April 1964
Cambodia-U.S. Aaaression
28 April 1965
U.S.S.R.··Dominican Intervention
Source: Yearbook'ofthe United Nations, 1955, 1958,1960,1961,1962,1964,1965.
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ingly hostile United Nations membership.
Pnbli(' Opinion in Ih(' World Ar('lIa.
The ::;tren)!th of the llnitl'tI ~Iate::; in IIIl'
United Nations is based primarily upon
thc political poslllr,. of the mcmI,(T
nations, bUl this political alignment is
influenced profoulldly by public
opinion within each individual member.
In a recent article in U.S. News and
World Report, the shift of altitudes of
people in repre:;enlative nations of the
world was found to be away from
support of intemationalism. As an
example, in a public opinion poll only
28 percent of Britons favored helping
the United States in a major crisis
involving Russia, and only 21 percent
favored support of the United States in
Vietnam. S Similar loss of enthusiasm
for American leadership was reported in
Italy. The growing tide of resentment
against U.S. foreign policy can be expected to produce an even further decline of American influence in the
United Nations during subsequent sessions.
VI--SUI\1l\lARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Unitcd Slates has, in recent
years, pursued a policy of opposition ,to
the concept of definin)! agl-Tfes:::ion lor
usc in determining t he aggressor in ca,;es
nnder consideration by thc United Nations. The Soviet Union, on the other
hand, has been instrumental in leadinl!
the effort to adoI'I sueh a definition and
repeatedly submilled its own draft
definition enumerating various acts
which could he considered clements of
agl,Tfession. The clash of the two s\Jf~er
powers on this issue raises the questIOn
of whether or not the United States has
accurately appraised the ramifications
of adopting a definition by thc Assembly, and if opposition to the Soviet
proposal is in the bcst interest of the
United States.
The United States has consistently
maintailH'd the posilion Ihat al!l!ressive

war is lolall\' olllsilll' il,; l'olil'y aim,; and
ha,; dl'llolln~'I'd ;III~ IH'rl'l'Iralor of al!)!l'l':::"ion as an inl('walional criminal.
This policy was steadfastly maintailH,d
in the face of opposition of many other
nations in the world community. The
Russian and French delegations at the
conference for development of the
charter for the Nuremberg trials
adopted a position that a general outlawry of aggressive war should not
necessarily be the subject of codification in the charter.
The United States has stood in the
van of the movement for outlawing
aggressive war but, in recent years, has
generally opposed attempts to define
aggression, particularly ill the United
Nations. The policy contrm.ts with early
recognition of various definitions in
treaties and conferences. Again, referring to the Nuremberg eonferenccs,
the U.S. delegate favored inclusion in
the charter of a definition almost identical to an earlier Russian proposal, and,
in this instance,- the Itussian delegate
opposed inclusion of a definition that
with his countrymen
in 1933.
Ori<nnated
e
,
In United Nalions deliberation!> on the
definition, thc fir:>t of which occurred in
1937, the United States adopted a
O'cneral policv of opposition to the
~ubject on !,rr'ounds that the definition
was neither po!>sible nor desirahle.
This policy was taken even though a
majority of the memhers considered
definition hoth possihle and desirahle.
There was rathcr widespread dislIl,Tfeement over the form of the definition.
Those favoring defining were split into
two basic camps: first, those who favored the Soviet definition, the "enumerative" type which categorized several acts that constituted aggression.
This tabulation was suhdivided into
general, ideological, and . econo.mic
aggression. The list of aggressive actIOns
was followed by a series of situations
which could not he used as excuses for
agl,Tfession. The second !,TfOUp of "defil\('rs" favored a rather hroad, ah:;tract
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definition lhal cmhr<tced only gencrill
lwninoill/,-,), which could be liherally
inlerpreted.
The policy of the United Slates in
opposing the concept of ucfinilion musl
be considered in the context of how
such a definition would affect American
foreign policy, assuming thal the position held by the United States was
generated by valid causative factors, and
not simply because the proposal was put
forlh by the Russians.
The basic tenet of the Soviet definition is that the first party to commit
any of the various acts is the guilty one.
These acts generally involve moving
troops across bordcrs, attacking by
other means, estahlishing blockades,
supporl of arllled hands, or promotion
of political upheaval in other Slales.
The United States has traditionally
intervened in cases where American
inlerests were threatened by overlhrow
of a friendly government or where
eSlahlishment of a favorahle regime
could he effecled. In lhis instance il has
generally been necessary to make eilher
overt or covert movements of troops
and to attack by sea or airpower, in
direct violation of the conditions of the
Hu:;:;ian definition.
The current prohlems besetting the
Unite(1 Slalcs in its overseas troop COIIImilmenls have dra:;lically reduced lhe
in-counlry strenglh of her ,Armed
Forces lhroughout the world and have
produccd a situation that will rcquire
even more obvious responses of the
United States in crises involving her
national interest. In contrast, the Soviet
Union, heing a major conLinenlal power,
can maintain Soviet or Soviet-controlled
troops in potential trouble areas that
can adequately cope with any developing situation. Under such conditions it
wiII be generally U1mecessary for her to
undertake the troop movements across
international borders specifically prohibited in her definition. Russia has
instead espoused the principle of waging
war through ideological campaigns

rather than furthering her national inlerests through direct military involvement.
In considering specific instances of
United Slates foreign policy episodes
against the Soviet definition, a large
proportion of the events prove to be in
direct conflict with the substance of this
definition. A 'general review of incidents
indicates that the U.S. actions could
generally result in a finding of "guilty"
against the United States.
The implications of the definition are
unimportant if the United States maintains her position as molder of world
opinion and leader of the majority of
the United Nations. The adverse effects
of the definition could become operative in cases where the United SlaLes
stands in a situalion where she is opposed in principle by a sufficient number of the member States. In these
circumstances many of the borderline
States normally amenable to American
policies could be shaken from their
traditional vote on the side of the
United States by the clear violation of
the criteria of aggression. This evidence
in "hlack and white" could provide a
suilable excuse for casting a vote for
world order.
An analysis of the record of the
United Nations indicates that circumstances could arise where the U.S. interests would inueed be influcnced by
declining powcr over member nations.
In the General A:;seillbly the trend
definitely toward fewer nations voting
with the United States on major issues.
During the early phases of Unilcd
Nations development no action could be
taken against the U.S. interests regardless of "guilt" or "innocence" in any
particular crisis. The Security Council
was the only United Nations body that
could enforce sanctions against offending nations, and the United States consistently could muster a sufficient numher of votes to defeat any adverse
action, even without the use of the veto
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power given to the five permanen t
members. The Americans had provided
a means for bypassing the Security
Council when action was precluded
through the application of a veto. Th15
provision, the Uniting for Peace Resolution, was intended primarily to provide
for United Nations actions in the face of
a Soviet veto. The United States has
never had to use a veto in the Security
Council, since enough votes could be
garnered to defeat any resolution adverse to United States interests. An
investigation of the trends exhibited in
the Security Council indicates that the
leaden;hip of the Uniled Slales has
declined in recent years.
The overall implication is that the

United Stales, in the face of gtc~aclily
declining popularity in the worlel com·
munity, could be confronted with con·
demnation hy adverse world opinion in
a situation involving the use of interna·
tional force. Under these conditions the
existence of a definition of aggression,
particularly the enumerative type
espoused by the Soviet Union, could be
used as a lever to swing the vote of the
United Nations membership against the
United States.
It is concluded that the policy of the
United States in opposing the definition
of aggression is in the best interests of
her larger foreign policy, ancI that con·
tinucd opposition in subsequent years
will become increasingly important.
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